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Singapore is alleged to be a key node in global ﬂows of e-waste prohibited under the Basel
Convention. We combine a close reading of the Convention and related documents with ﬁndings
from nonparticipant observation of and interviews with Singapore-based traders of discarded
electronics. The case offers both important conceptual and empirical ﬁndings for future studies of
territory in market-making activity. Conceptually, our research suggests that it may be analytically
useful in such studies to conceptualize territory without presupposing that it is generated as a result
of separate domains or logics such as ‘the political’ or ‘the economic’. Empirically, we ﬁnd that the
regulatory framework of the Convention, combined with the action of traders based in Singapore,
generates a territorialization of the city-state such that it operates as a crack in the regulatory ediﬁce
of the Convention, even as Singapore lawfully fulﬁls its obligations to it. Moreover, allegations
premised on the role of Singapore as a facilitator of global e-waste dumping misrepresent its crucial
role as a conduit of electronic equipment for the signiﬁcant reuse markets elsewhere in Southeast
Asia and beyond. The case indicates that the allegations against Singapore hinge on the city-state
being territorialized as a ‘developing country’.
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Territory is a word, a concept, and practice, and the complicated relation between these three
terms can only be grasped with historical, geographical, and conceptual speciﬁcity (Elden,
2013: 328).
The Parties to the Convention […] Fully recognizing that any State has the sovereign right to ban
the entry or disposal of foreign hazardous wastes and other wastes in its territory […] HAVE
AGREED AS FOLLOWS […] (Basel Secretariat, 2011a, emphasis original).
Introduction
Singapore is alleged to be a key node in the global networks of trade and trafﬁc that move
discarded electronics around the planet (Basel Action Network, 2002; Schwarzner et al.,
2005). The city-state is also a party to the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Shipment
of Hazardous Waste (hereafter the Basel Convention or, simply, the Convention), which is
the primary international treaty that regulates international shipments of hazardous waste.
The Convention is premised on a particular notion of territory that divides parties to the
Convention into two groups. One group, Annex VII parties (comprising the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Community (EC)
and Lichtenstein) is proscribed from exporting hazardous waste to the other group,
non-Annex VII parties (all other signatories). Singapore, a non-Annex VII party, is alleged
to be a territory that plays a key role in facilitating global ﬂows of electronic discards between
Annex VII and non-Annex VII parties.
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The Basel Secretariat has launched several studies focused on investigating the
‘e-waste’ trade and oversees expert technical working groups devoted to deliberations
over the status of electronic discards under the Convention (Basel Technical Working
Group, 1992; Basel Secretariat, 1994b; Basel Secretariat, 2011c). Under some circum-
stances the designation ‘hazardous waste’ characterizes discarded electronics that are
traded and trafﬁcked for many purposes including reuse, repair, refurbishment and
repurposing, as well as component recovery, recycling and disposal. While discarded
electronics are only one among several categories of hazardous wastes that are regulated
by the Convention, the trade and trafﬁc in these materials have become a special matter
of concern over the last decade.
In situating the territorialization of Singapore under the Basel Convention, we do not
claim that the Convention speciﬁcally, or environmental regulation more generally,
makes territory in toto. Instead, following work by Elden (2010; 2011; 2013), Painter
(2010) and others (e.g., Berndt & Boeckler, 2010; Gregson et al., 2013; Christophers,
2014b; Kama, 2015), we claim that Singapore’s status as a non-Annex VII party to the
Convention is a territorializing effect of regulatory action at work in the Convention
and its attendant policy documents. At the same time we argue that the existing outﬂow
of electronic discards from Singapore highlights its role as a ﬁssure in the Convention’s
regulatory ediﬁce of territory—a crack in the facade. From this observation, we point
to some broader questions about territory that might usefully direct future analyses in
the emerging literature on the territorialization of markets for waste (e.g., Gregson
et al., 2012; 2013; 2015; Kama, 2015).
Our paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst empirical section examines how the
Convention articulates territory. The section relies upon a close reading of publicly avail-
able documents from the Basel Secretariat. The documents selected for analysis include
the Convention itself and various reports and technical brieﬁngs related to the adoption
of Annex VII of the Convention in 1995. As discussed in more detail below, while Annex
VII has been adopted by the Basel Convention’s Conference of the Parties (COP), the
annex is not yet in legal force, because it has not yet been ratiﬁed by a sufﬁcient number
of parties to the Convention. Nevertheless, the territorial designations made in Annex
VII strongly colour the legal and policy interpretations of the Convention’s regulation
of transboundary shipments of hazardous waste.
The second empirical section of the paper principally draws on material collected dur-
ing ﬁeldwork in Singapore between May and August of 2011 and was premised on a
follow-the-thing approach (Cook, 2004; Crang & Cook, 2007). Brieﬂy, follow-the-thing
methodologies entail ethnographies of the particular, localized networks that assemble
the object under study as a ‘global thing’. Thus, through following the various connec-
tions associated with discarded electronics in Singapore, we were able to trace the trade
and business networks in the city-state that facilitate the trade in discarded electronics
throughout the Southeast Asian region and beyond.
This latter part of the research included nonparticipant observation and
semistructured interviews with 26 different individuals involved in the management
and trade of electronic discards in and through Singapore. Interviewees included
regulatory authorities, local electronics recyclers and foreign traders (all names are
pseudonyms). The bulk of the work was conducted with traders based in Singapore’s
Little India district, where there is a clustering of used electronics shops catering mostly
to foreign traders. Our ﬁeldwork identiﬁed a thriving international trade in electronic
discards from Singapore. The high per capita wealth of Singaporeans, coupled with the
large presence of ﬁrms in the ﬁnance, insurance and real estate sector, means substantial
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amounts of high-quality electronic discards arise domestically in Singapore. Also, the
city-state’s status under the Convention and its bi- and multilateral trade agreements
mean electronic discards can easily ﬂow to Singapore from abroad.
We conclude with a brief discussion of three key points. First, territorialization of
Singapore under the Convention hinges on it being construed as a ‘developing country’.
Second, while we concur with Elden (2013) and others that territory is a result of partic-
ular and contingent ways of conceptualizing and calculating space, we also suggest it is
analytically useful to hold in abeyance any presupposition of territory as a particular type
of technology (e.g., a political or economic one). Doing so, we suggest, would help the
study of territory account for both the making of territory and for the qualiﬁcation of it
as a particular type of technology.
Conceptualizing the territorialization of waste
It has long been recognized that waste making, value making and space making are mu-
tually constitutive processes (e.g., Douglas, 1966; Thompson, 1979; Lynch, 1990; Gille,
2007; Gidwani, 2012; Goldstein, 2013). Geographers interested in the territorialization
of waste and other externalities (e.g., Gregson et al., 2012; 2013; 2015; Kama, 2015) have
recently drawn on the geographies of marketization literature (e.g., Berndt & Boeckler,
2010; Christophers, 2014b) to explicate the building of spatially conﬁned markets for
the trade and management of waste and its retransformation into value. The notion of
spatially conﬁned markets for waste trading and management are relevant to the case
of Singapore and the Basel Convention. The Convention divides its parties into two blocs
of signatories, Annex VII and non-Annex VII; it prohibits hazardous waste trading from
Annex VII to non-Annex VII parties, while permitting such trade within each bloc (i.e.,
within Annex VII or non-Annex VII, see Lepawsky, 2015a). Thus, under the Convention
the trade in hazardous waste is to be conﬁned to markets within each territorial designa-
tion, Annex VII or non-Annex VII. As we discuss in subsequent sections, Singapore does
not ﬁt neatly into the Convention’s binary geographical ediﬁce. Consequently, we argue,
the city-state is a signiﬁcant crack in the facade of the Convention’s territorially de-
ﬁned markets. Furthermore, the making of these territorial blocs of signatories signals
a particular and contingent operationalization of territory within the Convention’s
regulatory texts.
For Gregson et al. (2013), marketization, waste and the building of spatially
conﬁned markets are linked through speciﬁc market devices (e.g., those for assaying
the metal content of ships for recycling) made relevant, because of the political work
of changing supranational governance regimes (in the form of regulation or legisla-
tion). In Gregson et al.’s (2013) case, those governance regimes were themselves
jump-started by NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and media exposés of the
global shipbreaking industry. Gregson et al. (2013) argue that their work enriches
the marketization literature in two ways (for useful introductions to the notion of
marketization, see Çalışkan & Callon, 2009; 2010). First, they document a different
set of devices (i.e., assay infrastructure) at work in the making of markets than those
identiﬁed by others in the marketization literature, such as computer algorithms or
the architectural arrangement of bidding spaces (e.g., Beunza et al., 2006;
MacKenzie, 2006; Callon et al., 2007). Second, Gregson et al. (2013) suggest that
their case demonstrates how the marketization of recycling is not just an economic
activity, but also a political one. Thus, their case conﬁrms the marketization litera-
ture’s argument that markets are achievements, but goes further by demonstrating
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that ‘recycling’s economization within spatially bounded markets is not a matter of
economic activity becoming political but rather of always being political’ (Gregson
et al., 2013: 20).
Gregson et al. (2013) convincingly show that ‘the political’ is in operation as a spa-
tially bounded market for recycling ships gets built. Yet they do so at the expense of
claiming that the economic activity of marketization is always political. If it is thus, then
describing marketization as ‘political’ risks being a redundancy, because Gregson et al.
(2013) skip over the challenge of tracing what generates their explicans (‘the political’).
Instead, they gift the explanatory power of ‘the political’, by allowing it to have always
already been there to do the explaining. Moreover, the marketization literature may
not be so blind to the political as Gregson et al. (2013) suggest, even if it might be argued
that the literature has yet to sufﬁciently document the role of the political and power in
the making of markets. For example, in a key marketization text Çalışkan (2010: 189)
argues that the global market for cotton is ‘a ﬁeld of power’ in which the ‘realization
of the price is a relation of power in itself’. But this is not just a rehearsal of political-
economy. For Çalişkan, ‘this universe of the market […] cannot be analytically located
by imposing boundaries that attach categorically separate logics of economics, scientiﬁc,
social, or political encounter’ (Çalışkan, 2010: 187). Meanwhile, Berndt (2013) uses the
economization approach to engage directly with explicating power and the politics of
violence necessary to the territorialization of markets-in-the-making in Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico. Arguably, a crucial difference exists between Gregson et al.’s (2013) approach
and that of others in the marketization genre such as Çalışkan (2010) and Berndt
(2013). For Çalışkan (2010), there are no separate domains or logics (e.g., of culture, pol-
itics, economics, technology, science, society) except to the extent that those domains or
logics are produced ‘by the researchers who assume independent spheres of life in the
struggle to make a global market’ in advance of doing their research (Çalışkan, 2010:
187). Thus, rather than being ill suited to accounting for politics in the making of mar-
kets, marketization theorists understand action and its subsequent retrospective qualiﬁ-
cation as this or that type of activity (e.g., economic, political, cultural, etc.) to be their
core research interest (Çalışkan’s point is shared by other marketization literature, e.g.,
Barry et al., 2002; Callon, 2007; 2010; and more broadly in the theoretical precepts of
actor-network theory, e.g., Mol, 1998; Latour, 2013; see also Cochoy et al., 2010 and
accompanying articles for an overview of the issue of politics in marketization). In short,
the economic and the political (among other possible qualiﬁers of action) are arrival
points, not departure points, for these thinkers. They are, in other words, second-order
effects just as territory is such an effect for Elden (2013) and Painter (2010).
Drawing on Boeckler and Berndt (2012) and Çalışkan and Callon (2010), Kama
(2015) examines an instance of market making for discarded electronics geared toward
instantiating a spatially bounded market within the European Union (EU). The territori-
alization of this market-in-the-making is envisioned as a ‘circular economy’, yet to date
its circularity remains imperfectly emplaced (cf. Gregson et al., 2015), because two-thirds
of electronic products placed on the EU market remain unaccounted for in regulatory
calculations of EU waste electrical and electronic equipment. These uncounted masses
are assumed by the authorities to have dissipated out of the EU through regulatory loop-
holes and gaps and thus necessitate further action to shore up the territorialized circular
economy. Kama (2015) shows that the spatial imaginary of a ‘circular economy’ is fun-
damental to the work of making a spatially bounded market territory—it provides a
meaningfully useful image for policy makers to deploy when framing the collective
experiment of governable action that is the EU. These ﬁndings lead Kama (2015) to
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conclude, like Berndt (2013) and Christophers (2014b), that territorialization is a funda-
mental aspect of making markets, i.e., to marketization. Thus, drawing on key geo-
graphic thinkers of territory (e.g., Painter, 2010; Elden, 2013), Kama (2015: 6)
understands the ‘economic territory’ of the EU to be both a particular socio-technical ar-
rangement and a political technology related to the EU’s desire to build a circular e-waste
economy, rather than a pre-extant bounded unit.
Notwithstanding their differences, a commonality across the above works, engaging
with market making and the territorialization of waste within spatially conﬁned markets,
is an understanding of territory to be a result of action. This understanding accords with a
series of recent publications by Elden (2010; 2011; 2013), who argues that territory can
be usefully approached as a result of historically and geographically situated ways of
understanding relations between power and place. How those relations are conceptual-
ized and practised generates the modern association of territory with the sovereign state
as a political technology. One of the signiﬁcant insights that follows from Elden’s work is
that territory is a result of a host of conceptual and practical economic, strategic, legal and
technological practices becoming amalgamated together, rather than a relatively
straightforward way of describing space with boundaries around it. In short, territory is
a second-order effect of particular and contingent ways of conceptualizing and
calculating space.
Elden’s approach to territory is genealogical in Foucault’s sense of the term. Such an
approach is about understanding the conditions that make possible things as they are.
Thus, Elden’s interest in territory is not in providing a universal, transhistorical deﬁnition
of it. Instead, his object of analysis is the situations in which particular notions and prac-
tices of territory emerged, which he examines through an historical excavation of their
conditions of possibility. For Elden, any actually existing notions and practices of terri-
tory are a relational result of those conditions of possibility. In line with Elden’s position,
Painter (2010) offers three potentially useful concepts for analyses of territory: contigu-
ity, continuity and boundedness. Drawing on a case study of English administrative
regions, Painter (2010) shows how all three concepts are relationally in play with one
another. Their collective effect is to provide a policy framework that generates these
administrative regions as policy objects arranged in part-whole relationships. Organized
as such, the administrative regions are understood to be internally undifferentiated and
coherent governable regions of space that are distinguishable from one another. They are
thus contiguous, continuous and bounded. What is of interest to Painter, like Elden, is an
undoing of the presumption that territory is an extant container. Instead, for Painter
(2010: 1116) territory is ‘a porous, provisional, labour intensive and ultimately perish-
able and non-material product of networked socio-technical approaches’. Territory, in
other words, does not exist in itself; rather an ecology of socio-technical practices enact
it into existence.
Elden’s and Painter’s work on territory are complementary but different. Both under-
stand territory to be a relational result of concepts and practices becoming amalgamated
together in action. What distinguishes their work from each other is the object of inquiry.
For Elden, the focus is on understanding the conditions of possibility that enable certain
notions and practices of territory thinkable and doable. For Painter, the issue is to under-
stand the socio-technical practices that generate speciﬁc versions of territory.
As we discuss in the next section, under the Basel Convention individual parties
become policy objects arranged as individual sovereign states that are members of one
of two territorial categories under the Convention: Annex VII or non-Annex VII parties,
with the latter prohibited from receiving discarded electronics from the former when
162 Josh Lepawsky and Creighton Connolly
those electronics are deemed to be hazardous waste. This prohibition is due to a presup-
position that non-Annex VII parties are unable to responsibly handle imports of hazard-
ous materials, despite large differences in industrial capacity within this bloc of
signatories. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Elden, Painter and others (e.g., Berndt
& Boeckler, 2010; Gregson et al., 2013; Christophers, 2014b; Kama, 2015), we suggest
how territory is an effect of the environmental regulation of the Basel Convention.
While a deep genealogical excavation of the Basel Convention’s version of territory is
beyond the scope of our paper, we do illustrate some evidence of the conditions that
made Basel signatories thinkable and doable as Annex VII versus non-Annex VII
territories. We also highlight evidence of some of the socio-technical practices that
assemble the regulatory space of the Basel Convention as territorialized units of signato-
ries comprised of spatially bounded markets for the transboundary movement of hazard-
ous waste.
The Basel Convention and territory as effect
The Basel Convention is an international treaty negotiated under the auspices of the
United Nations Environmental Programme (Kummer Peiry, 1995). The Convention
entered into legal force on 5 May 1992 and currently includes 183 parties, of which
53 are full signatories. Negotiations toward the Convention began in 1987. They
were originally framed in relation to international law governing ocean dumping
(Basel Secretariat, 1989) in part as a response to media exposés of waste dumping
at sea and in various countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America (see Wynne,
1989; Moyers, 1990; Clapp, 2001; Lepawsky, 2015a;). Singapore acceded to the
Convention on 2 January 1996 (Basel Secretariat, 2011b).
A close reading of key Convention texts shows that they articulate a vision of territory
derived from a distinct, locatable and historically speciﬁc conceptualization of signatories.
This conceptualization is evident in two broad ways: ﬁrst, as a divide between ‘industri-
alized’ versus ‘developing’ countries articulated in several key Convention documents
(discussed below), and second, as a set of principles that undergird notions of acceptable
and unacceptable forms of transboundary shipments of hazardous waste under the
Convention. Together these facets of the Convention generate a territorialization of its
parties that took on greater legal force as the Convention evolved toward ratiﬁcation
in 1992 and the adoption of Annex VII in 1995.
The ﬁnal report from the ﬁrst meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in 1992
refers explicitly to ‘industrialized’ and ‘developing’ countries as two broad categories of
states (Basel Secretariat, 1992). Yet, despite highly speciﬁed deﬁnitions for issues such
as meeting procedures, interorganizational relationships and various ﬁnancial consider-
ations, no deﬁnition of ‘industrialized’ and ‘developing’ parties exists in this report. This
lack of deﬁnition is notable for two reasons. First, it is suggestive of axiomatic assump-
tions about how the geography of parties to the Convention could be logically divided
into two broad territorial classiﬁcations (‘industrialized’ and ‘developing’ countries) to
achieve the regulatory goals of the Convention as it was being discussed by negotiators
at the ﬁrst COP meeting. That it was not deemed necessary to deﬁne ‘industrialized’ or
‘developing’ parties in these early rounds of negotiations suggests that their meanings
were straightforward and shared among those in attendance. The division was, in other
words, a condition of possibility for thinking and doing territory (Elden, 2013) that was
shared among those in attendance to such an extent that it did not even warrant com-
mentary in the public record of the meeting, even as it was used to conceptually group
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states into policy objects (Painter, 2010). As Sidaway (2012) has recently observed, the
use of categories such as ‘the developing world’ still proliferates in mainstream media
and policy documents, despite their decreasing relevance. Other human geographers
have argued that such territorializations are a result of seemingly unconscious and unre-
ﬂective constructions of the world and the way particular processes operate (e.g.,
Sidaway & Pryke, 2000; Kaika, 2006). This, we argue, has been particularly prevalent
in the development of the Basel Convention, which has transformed an axiomatic con-
struction of the world into legally enforceable regulations. As such, a particular shared
conceptualization of territory can be observed taking shape and gaining in performative
force through its incorporation into the Convention’s supporting policy documents.
Second, the absence of a deﬁnition for ‘industrialized’ or ‘developing’ countries in this
report from the ﬁrst meeting of the COP points to the importance of deﬁnitions given to
these categories over time in subsequent meeting documents. Documents produced at
each subsequent COP meeting increasingly speciﬁed which parties ﬁt the ‘industrialized’
versus ‘developing’ distinction. Thus, at the second COP meeting the territorial divide
between industrialized and developing countries is deﬁned as the difference between
parties that are also members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD, i.e., ‘industrialized’) and those that are not (non-OECD, i.e.,
‘developing’) (Basel Secretariat, 1994a: 19). The division was codiﬁed into the Conven-
tion as Annex VII, known as the Ban Amendment, which was added to the original
Convention text in 1995. Thus, over time the conceptual division of territory accumu-
lates greater performative force, as it moved out of the realm of policy negotiation and
became incorporated directly into a legally enforceable document, the Basel Convention
itself.
Figure 1 illustrates how the Basel Convention and the Ban Amendment are to work
in principle. Transboundary shipments of hazardous waste within the Annex VII group
and within the non-Annex VII group are permissible. What is not permitted is
transboundary shipment from Annex VII to non-Annex VII parties of anything the
Convention deﬁnes as hazardous waste in three other parts of the treaty, Annexes III,
VIII and IX. This clause may seem relatively straightforward, but a number of ambiguities
exist. For example, Annex III provides a list of hazardous characteristics but states ‘the
Figure 1. The operation of the Basel Convention in principle.
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potential hazards posed by certain types of wastes are not yet fully documented; tests to
deﬁne quantitatively these hazards do not exist’ (Basel Secretariat, 2011a: 59).
Meanwhile, both Annexes VIII (wastes considered hazardous) and IX (non-wastes) con-
tain materials that pertain to discarded electronics. Thus the calculability of materials as
toxicological hazards remains ambiguous, even as the Convention attempts to institute
clearly enforceable regulations premised on unambiguous divisions of territory (cf.
Wynne, 1989).
The division of parties to the Convention into one or the other of the two groups,
Annex VII or non-Annex VII, is further inﬂected by three explicitly stated principles that
further specify their territorialization. These principles—‘self-sufﬁciency’, ‘proximity’
and ‘least transboundary movement’—were articulated early on in Basel negotiations
and the work of various technical and expert working groups charged with clearly
deﬁning and implementing the Convention and its provisions (Basel Technical Working
Group, 1992: 11; Basel Secretariat, 2004: 5). The principle of self-sufﬁciency states that:
countries should ensure that the disposal of the waste generated within their territory is
undertaken there by means which are compatible with environmentally sound management,
recognizing that economically sound management of some wastes outside of national territories
may also be environmentally sound ( Basel Secretariat, 1994b: 5).
The principle of proximity states that:
the disposal of hazardous wastes must take place as close as possible to their point of generation,
recognizing that economically and environmentally sound management of some wastes will be
achieved at specialized facilities located at greater distances from the point of generation (Basel
Secretariat, 1994b: 5).
Finally, the principle of least transboundary movement states that such movements
‘should be reduced to a minimum consistent with efﬁcient and environmentally sound
management’ (Basel Secretariat, 1994b: 5).
Each of these principles in the Technical Guidelines presupposes a territorialization
that resonates strongly with the work reviewed above on the making of spatially
bounded markets for waste and the role of territory in that market-making action. For
example, self-sufﬁciency implies that states should be autarkic when it comes to
managing hazardous wastes arising within their national borders. This particular, even
peculiar, territorialization of waste takes as axiomatic that it is right and proper for the
management of waste arising from the global commodity chains typically connecting
producers and consumers across borders to be conﬁned within the borders of the states
in which those ‘global’ products like electronics are bought and consumed. Thus, in this
territorialization evident in the Convention, production may be ‘global’, but attending to
the postconsumption wastes generated from this production is to have a different spatial
organization, one ideally conﬁned within national borders. The peculiarity of this
territorialization of waste is highlighted if one were to imagine an international trade
agreement that required states to be self-sufﬁcient in the production of the commodities
consumed by their respective populations. Similarly paradoxical notions of territory are
at work in the principle of proximity and least transboundary movement when it comes
to managing electronic discards as waste. Typically, electronics are designated as waste
generated by household and institutional consumers. Yet, the composition of those
products—what they are made of and how they are put together—that will eventually
become such waste are given a form and arrangement elsewhere, for example, in design
and manufacturing practices that occur in locations that do not necessarily correspond
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with the locale of the vast majority of consumers. So conceptualizing waste as generated
in the locale of consumption is, again, a particular and contingent territorialization of
waste that could be arranged differently.
Moreover, the Convention does not explicitly prohibit the transboundary shipment
of hazardous waste from non-Annex VII to Annex VII parties. This lack of explicitness
is, perhaps, not surprising given the concerns expressed during the negotiations between
1992 and 1995 over the Ban Amendment about the capacity of developing countries to
manage hazardous waste in an environmentally sound manner. What the lack of such
language demonstrates, then, is an underlying sense of continuity (Painter, 2010) to
the territorialization of the world as it is concretized in the Convention as environmental
regulation. In other words, the territorialization of parties ﬁxed in the past under Annex
VII continues indeﬁnitely into the future regardless of whether a given party’s capacity
for environmentally sound management of hazardous waste changes.
Situating Singapore
Singapore is alleged to be a major transshipment hub for waste electronics discarded
abroad and brought via Singapore to other countries in the region (Connolly, 2012).
Figure 2. Map depicting Singapore’s alleged role in transboundary ﬂows of electronic discards.
Source: Adapted from Schwarzner et al. (2005).
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These allegations are typically framed in terms of transboundary movements of ‘e-waste’
that are prohibited under the Basel Convention (Schwarzner et al., 2005; Figure 2). Yet,
Singapore’s situation troubles the notion of territory operating in the Convention. The
country is in itself a signiﬁcant source of discarded electronics, rather than merely a
transshipment hub, because of its high level of afﬂuence relative to other non-Annex
VII parties. For example, ranked in terms of GDP (gross domestic product) per capita,
Singapore (USD 55 182) was the ninth wealthiest country in the world in 2013 (World
Bank, 2015a). Similarly, it ranked eighth in terms of gross national income per capita in
2013 (World Bank, 2015b) and second by this measure when adjusted for purchasing
power parity (USD 78 860) (World Bank, 2015c). Indeed, Singapore’s GDP per capita
has exceeded the average of Annex VII’s since 1994 and substantially so since 2000
(Figure 3). Figures such as these demonstrate the difﬁculty in construing Singapore as
a ‘developing country’, as the city-state’s non-Annex VII status would suggest it is.
Singapore’s rapid rise in afﬂuence during the 50 years subsequent to its split with
Malaysia is a well-documented story and will not be elaborated on here (e.g., Field &
Smith, 1986; Mahizhman, 1999; Olds & Yeung, 2004). Rather, the remainder of this
section utilizes empirical research from Singapore in considering how this high level of
afﬂuence inﬂuences the domestic generation of electronic discards in Singapore and
international trade of these materials among other non-Annex VII states. As Adam
Ong, a representative of a regional electronics refurbishing and end-of-life treatment
company told us, ‘in a per capita sense, [Singapore’s] e-waste output is very high, very
very high. Within Asia I think Singapore is actually number one, on a per capita basis.
For a small country, it generates a lot of e-waste’ (pers. comm., Singapore, 5 July
2011). This claim is bolstered by recent UN data that estimate the per capita generation
of e-waste by Singaporeans at 19.6 kg in 2014, far ahead of its closest neighbours,
Malaysia (7.6 kg per capita) and Indonesia (3.0 kg per capita), and ahead of even Japan
(17.3 kg per capita) and South Korea (15.9 kg per capita) (UN StEP, 2015). Indeed, the
per capita e-waste generation of Singapore ranks it as one of the highest per capita
generators of e-waste globally. It is just behind the USA (22.1 kg per capita), Canada
(20.4 kg per capita) and on par with much of Europe.
Figure 3. Comparison of Singapore’s GDP per capita with Annex VII average GDP per capita, 1960–2012.
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In accounting for Singapore’s high per capita e-waste generation, Singh, a Bangladeshi
electronics trader in Little India, drew attention to two factors: ﬁrst, the afﬂuence of its pop-
ulation, which affects the rapid rate of disposal of electronics by Singaporeans who favour
and can afford the newest devices; and second, Singapore’s substantial base of multinational
corporations and corporate headquarters especially in the ﬁnance, insurance and real estate
(FIRE) sector (pers. comm., Singapore, 1 June 2011). Indeed, with respect to corporate
headquarters, Singapore is comparable to second-tier global cities worldwide such as Syd-
ney, Paris and Chicago (Chia & Lim, 2003; Globalization and World Cities Research Net-
work, 2011). The dependence of these ﬁrms on sophisticated electronic devices is
increasingly high, yet these devices are often only used for a limited time before being
discarded, resulting in a considerable amount of high-quality discarded electronics being
generated in the country.
Moreover, Justin Ng, a Singapore-based environmental activist and discarded-electronics
collector told us that, while there are collection points for electronics around the country,
they typically do not receive as much equipment as intended. In Singapore take-back
programmes and collection drives are voluntary and occur in a patchwork of dates and
locations largely overseen by private ﬁrm initiatives (pers. comm., Singapore, 6 June 2011;
National Environment Agency, 2013). The low collection rates in Singapore were identiﬁed
as problematic by Ng, because of the high rates of ownership and use of electronic devices by
Singaporeans. Indeed, as of 2013, there were 156 cell phone subscriptions per 100
Singaporeans (World Bank, 2015d), and 85 per cent of the population had personal
computers (International Telecommunications Union, 2015). This latter ﬁgure puts
Singapore among the top 15 countries worldwide in terms of personal computers per
Figure 4. Handbill soliciting ‘spoilt’ handphones and other electronics posted on wall in Little India. Photo-
graph taken by Josh Lepawsky during preliminary ﬁeldwork, 8 July 2009.
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household, behind Finland, the UK and United Arab Emirates, but ahead of Canada, Swit-
zerland and Ireland.
Accordingly, our ﬁeldwork revealed a thriving export market from Singapore for
domestically generated electronic discards (Figures 4, 5). As Franz Verhagen, a
Singapore-based electronics recycling consultant, pointed out, any used electronic equip-
ment that still contain ‘market value’ are typically sold into export markets for reuse via
an integrated system of formal and informal used commodity and waste collectors (pers.
comm., Singapore, 19 May 2011; cf. Neo, 2010). Many of the local traders based in
Singapore use the government electronic business (GeBIZ) website (Government of
Singapore, 2015) to purchase the IT assets that they then refurbish and resell, dismantle
for components or scrap for raw materials. This electronic database was set up by the
Singapore government in June 2000, as part of the e-Government Action Plan (e-GAP I)
to improve the efﬁciency of procurement of electronics in the city-state (Civil Service
College, 2010). Most procurement activities by Singapore’s government are conducted
through the e-GAP I. Generally, these procurement activities are the responsibility of
individual government organizations (e.g., ministries and departments), which indepen-
dently advertise tenders for sale of their retired electronics under guidelines from the cen-
tral government’sMinistry of Finance. Singapore-based traders can registerwithGeBIZ and
bid for the government’s IT equipment (Connolly, 2012).
With respect to discarded electronics, traders who export to international markets are
mainly concentrated in Singapore’s Little India district. As traders there related to us, the
bulk of Singapore’s electronic discards are exported for reuse, refurbishment,
repurposing, component recovery and material recycling. Traders we interviewed
included both Singaporean nationals and foreigners who either are based in Singapore
or travel there frequently from their home countries to glean from Singapore’s large
supply of high-quality electronic discards. For example, Dewan, a Bangladeshi trader
based in the area, told us his important foreign buyers come from Nigeria, Sri Lanka,
India, Bangladesh, Kenya, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia
(pers. comm., Singapore, 17 June 2011; Connolly, 2012). Usually Dewan exports either
full computers or working accessories like printers, as opposed to smaller scrap parts,
because of the more limited market (and prices) for scrap items. The electronics traded
Figure 5. Handbill advertising per kilogram freight rates by air and ship for electronics to India and
Bangladesh posted on wall in Little India. Photograph taken by Josh Lepawsky during preliminary ﬁeldwork,
8 July 2009.
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from his shop are typically three years old or less, which are determined to have the
highest market value. Between 10 and 20 buyers visit Dewan’s shop per month. Most
of them are return customers who have developed trusted export business relationships
with Dewan over the past three years (Connolly, 2012). Dewan’s experience under-
scores two key points. First, export for reuse, not disposal, fetches the highest returns
for traders such as Dewan. Second, the typical age range for the equipment Dewan sells
is three years or less and, thus, is indicative of rapid turnover rates for digital equipment
by Singaporeans—many of whom can afford to discard items in favour of newer models
within relatively short use cycles. Thus, to construe Singapore as a source of ‘e-waste’
exported to other countries for dumping without considering its role as a source of
equipment for reuse would be an inaccurate and highly partial narrative.
Foreign traders are attracted to Singapore because of the high quality of electronics
discarded there. The quick turnover time for electronic devices in Singapore means that
these electronics have a high reuse potential after being discarded (Connolly, 2012).
Likewise, cell phones and tablet PCs are only used for one or two years before they are
replaced, at which point they are still quite often near state-of-the-art technologies.
Another Little India-based trader told us that other countries in Asia, including China
and Korea, also export discarded electronics, but the quality is not as good because
traders in those locations often take out the valuable components for domestic resale,
which is a less common practice in Singapore. Other afﬂuent countries like Canada,
the United States and European Union nations also have high-quality discarded
electronics, but it is much harder for traders to get visas to go to these locations, and it
is increasingly difﬁcult to export from those locales.
What our interviews indicate, then, is the key role that electronics discarded domes-
tically in Singapore play in the international trade of discarded electronics to non-Annex
VII countries. As a non-Annex VII party there is nothing in the Basel Convention
prohibiting Singapore from exporting domestically sourced discarded electronics to other
non-Annex VII parties. At the same time, the Basel Convention also contains a provision
(Article 11) that honours any bi- or multilateral trade agreements signed between two or
Figure 6. Singapore’s role in transboundary ﬂows of electronic discards as a non-Annex VII party. Compare
with Figure 1.
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more parties to the Convention, so long as those agreements meet or exceed the
requirements of environmentally sound management. However, the Convention deﬁnes
environmentally sound management in such broad terms that it remains open to very
wide interpretation. Singapore maintains free-trade agreements with a number of
Annex VII parties, including the United States, Switzerland (also a member of the
Schengen Area and the EU single market, though not the EU), Japan and South Korea
(Government of Singapore, 2012). Meanwhile, Singapore also has trade agreements
with each of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, all of
which are less wealthy than Singapore and thus have large domestic markets for its
high-quality discarded electronics. Singapore’s afﬂuence, together with its designation
as a non-Annex VII party and its trade agreements, means that it cracks open the mono-
lithic territorial divisions of the Basel Convention (Figure 6). A net effect is to make Sin-
gapore a crucial source of electronic discards for other non-Annex VII parties in ways
that are unaccounted for in the regulatory calculations and spatially conﬁned markets
for discarded electronics generated by the Convention. The case thus illustrates the
regulatory loopholes and peculiar territorial classiﬁcations inherent in the Convention,
which have strong implications for its continued relevance (see Lepawsky, 2015b).
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, the case of discarded electronics traded from Singapore under the reg-
ulation of the Basel Convention enables us to make three points. First, our empirical discus-
sion of the Convention shows that Singapore’s territorialization as a non-Annex VII party
hinges on the city-state being construed as a ‘developing country’. As such, Singapore is un-
derstood in the Convention as equally vulnerable as all other non-Annex VII parties to haz-
ardous waste imports from Annex VII parties. Yet, our empirical work shows that the city-
state is a key node in the international ﬂows of electronic discards to other non-Annex VII
parties via the work of discarded electronics traders in Singapore who facilitate this trade.
We suggested that Singapore is able to play this role for several interrelated reasons: ﬁrst,
Singapore’s relative and absolute per capita wealth mean Singaporeans are heavy consumers
and discarders of electronics; second, the large presence of the FIRE sector in the city-state
means high-quality electronic equipment is discarded as a consequence of regular and fre-
quent equipment refreshment at such ﬁrms; third, trade between non-Annex VII parties is
permitted under the Convention; and fourth, the Convention also permits bi- and multilat-
eral trade agreements to supersede theConvention on the condition that theymeet or exceed
the Convention’s requirements of environmentally sound management of hazardous waste.
In these respects, Singapore is a crack in the regulatory facade of the Basel Convention,which
attempts to enact a spatially conﬁned market for waste.
Second, we can make some conceptual contributions to the emerging literature on the
territorialities ofwaste (e.g., Gregson et al., 2012; 2013; 2015; Kama, 2015). Our case conﬁrms
that it is analytically useful to approach territory as a result of particular and contingent ways
of conceptualizing and calculating space. With respect to discarded electronics traded from
Singapore under the regulation of the Basel Convention, territory is partially a result of envi-
ronmental regulation. The conceptualization and calculation of territory in that regulation de-
pends on categorizations of signatories into one of two groups, Annex VII or non-Annex VII
territories. Those categorizations are themselves founded on axiomatic understandings of ‘in-
dustrial’ versus ‘developing’ countries. However, the case also suggests that when analysing
the action of territorialization more generally, researchers may ﬁnd it worthwhile to hold
in abeyance any qualiﬁcations of territory as a particular ‘type’ of technology, whether
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political (Painter, 2010; Elden, 2013), economic (Berndt, 2013; Gregson et al., 2013;
Christophers, 2014b; Kama, 2015) or otherwise. In our case, the Basel Convention attempts
to institute a regulatory apparatus for governing the trade of things calculated, ideally via tox-
icological science, to have hazardous consequences for human bodies and environments. As
such, in addition to having political and economic facets, the Convention also relies on the
territorialization of signatories to mitigate danger in both a toxicological and moral sense.
What this multiplicity of action (e.g., political, economic, toxicological, moral) in the making
of territory suggests to us is that such action has no inherent qualities of being a political or eco-
nomic technology per se. If so, we question the analytical value of construing territory as an
intrinsic type of technology (e.g., a political technology, cf. Painter (2010) and Elden (2013);
an economic technology, cf. Berndt (2013) and Christophers (2014b); or an-always-already-
political-economic-socio-technical-arrangement, cf. Gregson et al. (2013) and Kama (2015)).
We might say it is more analytically useful to approach territory as an ‘X-technology’, where
what constitutes ‘X’ is, like territory, also a more open-ended result in the case at hand. Such
an approach would be suited toward investigating Çalişkan’s (2010: 187) assertion that the
universe of themarket ‘cannot be analytically located by imposing boundaries that attach cat-
egorically separate logics of economics, scientiﬁc, social, or political encounter’. An approach
to territory attuned to this assertionwould be sensitive to how territory becomes qualiﬁed as a
particular type of technology (e.g., political or economic).
Third, if it is analytically useful to conceptualize territory as an ‘X-technology’, then the study
of territory would become the study of techniques (i.e., devices and the practices with which
they are situated such that they work) without imposing in advance the designation of those
techniques as ‘political’ or ‘economic’ (or any other designation e.g., ‘scientiﬁc’ or ‘cultural’).
For by designating in advance territory to be a particular type of technology (political, economic,
etc.), we forgo the opportunity to investigatewhat generates ‘the political’ or ‘the economic’ ba-
ses of the technology fromwhich territory is said to result. Here, then, is an opening for future
studies to put the geographic literature on territory and the territorialization ofmarkets into fur-
ther productive conversationwith themarketization literature (cf. Christophers, 2014a) as well
as with recent Actor Network Theory-based approaches to territory (see Conway, 2016). This
alternative kind of approach to territory would open up the investigation of it to also include
analyses of the qualiﬁcation of the action from which territory results. The approach would
be, in other words, to make the technology of territory a more fully philosophical inquiry into
the practices and tools by which territory results.
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